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The Phu My Hung New Urban Development (PMH) in Ho Chi Minh City is a rare successful case in many ways. The developers were
able to assemble large tracks of land and secure ﬁnancial means to ﬁnish big components of a megaproject. They have also had
motivation to provide ample and aﬀordable public goods and urban services to earn huge proﬁts. However, these incentives can decrease
altogether as the developments become sold out. Moreover, PMH is only a part of the Saigon South Master Plan, whose implementation
has essentially failed. There are also serious social and environmental concerns.
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Numerous complimentary words have been ascribed to
Phu My Hung New Urban (PMH), especially in its twenti-
eth year ceremony in 2013 (HIDS & PMH Corp., 2013).
Foreigners usually express their surprise when they see
such a modern town in Vietnam. The 409 ha luxurious
urban area in Ho Chi Minh City (HCMC) has been consid-
ered highly successful in several major aspects. The city has
a prestigious urban area; the residents enjoy high quality
amenities; the government has received large budget
revenues; and the developers have earned lucrative proﬁts.
Moreover, it also creates a positive impact on real estate
values in the region as proximity to PMH is considered ahttp://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.ijsbe.2015.03.005
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and Development.valued characteristic for surrounding projects and is a fea-
ture commonly referred to in advertisements (Huynh,
2012).
Peiser and Chang (1999) found that it is possible to
develop ﬁnancially successful new towns, but it is extremely
diﬃcult. Interestingly, PMH is a rare successful case: the
swampland over ﬁve kilometers from downtown to the
south of HCMC was valued at almost nothing two decades
ago but has now become one of Vietnam’s most coveted
residential areas (Nguyen, 2008). The vacant land in 2011
was valued on average USD 4000/SQM, higher than those
from USD 1200–2500/SQM of the surrounding projects
(World Bank, 2011) and HCMC’s GDP per capita at about
USD 3000 (HIDS, 2012). As estimated in following
sections, the average value of apartments in PMH in the
fourth quarter of 2011 was about 43% higher than that
of surrounding developments; and the project’s ﬁnancial
net present value (NPV) is highly positive.duction and hosting by Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
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scape of urban development in HCMC. When the project
was proposed in the early 1990s, Saigon South was not
one of the municipal government’s major considerations
as the northeast quadrant had been determined as the city’s
major direction of expansion in the 1993 Master Plan.
However, this has completely changed. The southeast
quadrant was later chosen as the major expansion direction
in the city’s 2010 Master Plan and PMH has been chosen as
a typical urban development model by the Vietnamese
Government (Ministry of Construction, 2008).
PMH’s success is undeniable. However, this urban area
is only a part of a megaproject consisting of a 2600 ha mas-
ter plan of Saigon South with a ten lane road, a 375 MW
power plant, and a 300 ha export processing zone (EPZ)
(SOM, 1993). Holistically, placing PMH in a fragmented
development of Saigon South, having an unproﬁtable
power plant, and facing the challenge of assembling the rest
of the 600 ha of land promised by the municipal govern-
ment to be granted for the developer, shows clearly that
PMH’s success is only a part of the whole story.
Moreover, the development of Saigon South is also causing
undesirable externalities (Douglass and Huang, 2007;
Waibel, 2004). The leapfrog construction on wetland
creates several issues. These include: the burdens on infras-
tructure, segregation due to gated communities, environ-
mental problems from ﬁlling swampland and increasing
ﬂood risk by situating developments on low-lying land
despite sea levels rising is a highly dangerous issue for
HCMC (Huynh, 2012).
What has happened in PMH echoes what DiPasquale
and Wheaton (1993, p.358) describe:
When land is developed at a larger scale, it is more likely
that compatible design, landscaping, infrastructure, and
other public goods will be provided, assuming that these
features really do add to the net collective value of the
property being developed. [However], there are two
problems with relying on a larger scale of development.
First, it is sometimes diﬃcult both to assemble large
tracts of land and to acquire the capital resources for
such large-scale development. Second, this solutionFig. 1. Price distribution of PMH’s apartmentworks only to internalize externalities and provide initial
public goods at the time of development.
This research seeks to demonstrate that DiPasquale
and Wheaton’s (1993) arguments have actually happened
in the case of PMH and the issues raised need to be
addressed. Thus, the rest of this article is structured as
follows: the second section shows the empirical evidence
of the real estate price premium in PMH; the third sec-
tion shows the way to create a desirable living amenity;
the fourth section presents outcomes along with con-
cerns; and conclusions and lessons are in the ﬁnal
section.2. The real estate premium in Phu My Hung
PMH is located in District 7 which has now become the
most vibrant real estate market in HCMC. The district is
36 SQKM large, roughly the same size of ﬁve districts that
make up the current downtown and among the least dense
districts of the inner city. Originally, it used to be one of the
city’s poorest districts, but is now a favorite choice of the
aﬄuent due to the PMH development. The district’s
budget revenue is among the highest of any district and
most households live in newly built condominiums or
new urban areas and enjoy middle and high incomes
(DOS-HCMC, 2011).
A major proportion of District 7’s area was once
swampland, but most of its land is now highly valued real
estate. According to information posted on the website
www.muabannhadat.com.vn – the most popular newspa-
per for real estate advertisement in Vietnam – as of
November 8, 2011, District 7 had 102 real estate projects
while the other 22 districts in HCMC shared 454 projects.
The information also shows that despite being a peripheral
district further from the central business district than Binh
Thanh and Phu Nhuan, its arithmetic average real estate
property prices are signiﬁcantly higher. The high value of
real estate in District 7 is primarily due to the PMH urban
area (Huynh, 2012) where apartment prices in PMH are
signiﬁcantly higher than similar apartments of its
neighbors (Fig. 1).s and surrounding ones’. Source: Author’s.
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To test whether there are signiﬁcant diﬀerences between
real estate prices in PMH and those in the surroundings, a
quantitative analysis based on a hedonic model is pursued.
The data used in this research were collected from
www.muabannhadat.com.vn in the fourth quarter of
2011 and some supplemental data points such as the com-
pletion years of certain buildings were collected from other
sources. All chosen buildings are in District 7, as illustrated
in Fig. 2.
The sample consists of 263 apartments for sale in 36
buildings, in which 91 apartments are in 20 buildings of
PMH, and 172 apartments are in 16 surrounding buildings.
The data set contains information on the characteristics of
the apartments, of the buildings in which these apartments
are located, and of the projects where buildings are located.
All variables and statistics are explained in Table 1.2.1.1. Dependent variables
Prices of apartments and prices per square meter of
apartments are two dependent variables and are denotedFig. 2. Condominium Buildings in District 7.by P and P-SQM, respectively. The mean asking prices
for the sample are VND2,490 million per apartment and
VND25.2 million/SQM.
2.1.2. Diﬀerentiating variables
PMH is denoted as a dummy variable and LAND is
measured as land areas of projects; both are two dif-
ferentiating variables used to measure the real estate price
diﬀerences between PMH and its neighbors. It is expected
that the coeﬃcients of these variables will be positive and
statistically signiﬁcant. The number of apartments in
PMH accounts for 35% of the sample. The mean land area
is 146.2 ha; however, this is a misleading number because
the size of PMH is 409 ha while the other projects are much
smaller (most of them are less than 1 ha). The LAND vari-
able, in fact, plays a similar role of the PMH variable as the
correlation between these two variable is 0.999. Therefore,
they cannot be in the same regressions due to multi-
colinearity.
2.1.3. Other characteristics
Besides the above variables, basic characteristics for
hedonic regressions are included as presented in Table 1.Source: Author’s building in Arcmap 10.
Table 1
Data description.
Variable Description/Unit Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max.
Dependent variables
P Price per apartment (VND million) 2490 1395 899 8400
P-SQM Price per SQM (VND million) 25.2 8.7 13.3 51.2
Diﬀerentiating variables
PMH Projects of PMH = 1; other = 0 0.35 0.48 0 1
LAND Land area of projects (ha) 146.2 191.6 0.2 409
Other variables
Area Area of an apartment (m2) 96 25 51 178
Bed Number of bedrooms (#) 2.4 0.6 1 5
Bath Number of bedrooms (#) 2.0 0.6 1 5
Grade Grade of building (A = 1; Others = 0) 0.35 0.48 0 1
Age Number of years (2011 = 1) 2.98 2.64 0 12
FAR Floor area ratio (built area/land area) 5.73 1.35 3.08 8.28
To-CBD Distance to CBD (km) 7.32 1.61 4.26 10.74
Source: Author’s collection from the Internet in the fourth quarter, 2011.
1 A variable of the distance to the sub-CBD has been tested. The place
chosen as the sub-CBD is the Crescent, the Iconic place of PMH (Waibel,
2010). However, it is not statistically signiﬁcant and R2 does not change.
Therefore, this variable was not included in the chosen regressions.
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The semi-log hedonic regression model is chosen as
follows:
Ln ðPriceÞ ¼ b0 þ b1PMH=LAND þ b2Areaþ b3Bed
þ b4Bathþ b5Gradeþ b6Ageþ b7FAR
þ b8To-CBD þ e
The regression results are presented in Table 2 below.
The adjusted R-Squares of the regressions are around 0.9
for regressions of log of total price; and over 0.8 for regres-
sions of log of price per SQM, which means that the chosen
variables almost explain the price of apartments. As
expected, all variables are highly signiﬁcant except the
number of bedrooms and the number of bathrooms.
The LAND variable basically plays a similar role as the
PMH variable. After multiplying the magnitudes of
coeﬃcients by 409 ha – the size of the PMH project – the
values are similar to the coeﬃcients of the PMH variable.
Moreover, the signiﬁcant levels and magnitudes of the
other variables in each pair of regressions are very similar
to one another.
The results demonstrate that the average value of apart-
ments in PMH is over 43% higher than that of surrounding
developments as a whole, and 47% for price per SQM. We
hypothesize that the diﬀerence is that PMH has been able
to internalize externalities. The positive outcomes of
PMH comes from how the developer has strategically
planned and implemented key processes including urban
planning, ﬁnancing mechanisms, construction activities,
marketing, and urban service provisions. Providing public
amenities and public goods helps increase the real estate
value of the development.
The coeﬃcients of other variables follow expectations.
On average, a 1 m2 increase in the apartment area results
in about a 1% increase in the apartment price. Each year
progressively causes the price of apartments decreases
about 2%. If the ﬂoor area ration (FAR) increases onetime, the apartment price decreases 7%. Prices of apart-
ments in Grade-A buildings are about one quarter higher
than those of lower grade buildings. One kilometer away
from the CBD, the real estate value decreases over 2%.1
3. The process to create a desirable living amenity
3.1. A brief history of the project
The initial initiative of the PMH project was to build an
export processing zone (EPZ) to attract foreign direct
investment and generate export revenue and it has been
evolved over time. In 1988, the Friday Group – led by
Mr. Phan Chanh Duong, who later became a founder of
the PMH project – conducted “The Study of Building
EPZs in HCMC” (Nguyen et al., 2006). With support from
the city’s leaders, this idea was put into the pilot list of the
city to pursue new policies when Vietnam started to trans-
form from the central planning model to a market econ-
omy. Since then, Mr. Phan and his colleagues began
seeking foreign partners. After painstaking eﬀorts with
many proposals and rejections, they ﬁnally found a compe-
tent Taiwanese investor – the Central Trading and
Development Corporation (CT&D)-owned by
Kuomintang (KMT), the ruling party in Taiwan at the
time. However, it was not the CT&D but the Pan Viet
Corporation who was Vietnam’s ﬁrst Taiwanese partner.
The Pan Viet Corporation specialized in growing bananas
in Vietnam to export to Japan but did not have experience
in building EPZs. Nonetheless, it supported the PMH pro-
ject in order to have favorable conditions for its main busi-
nesses in Vietnam and withdrew shortly after CT&D’s
appearance (IPC, 2001).
Table 2
Regression results.
Log of total price Log of price per SQM
PMH 0.43*** 0.473***
(14.84) (17.6)
LAND 0.0011*** 0.0012***
(14.72) (17.32)
Area 0.01*** 0.011***
(15.98) (16.15)
Bed 0.025 0.026 0.021 0.017
(0.91) (0.94) (1.03) (0.84)
Bath 0.026 0.022 0.025 0.022
(1.2) (1.03) (1.24) (1.08)
Grade 0.248*** 0.237*** 0.247*** 0.239***
(10.91) (10.39) (12.57) (12.07)
Age 0.026*** 0.026*** 0.031*** 0.031***
(5.48) (5.55) (6.97) (7.04)
FAR 0.07*** 0.069*** 0.072*** 0.071***
(7.76) (7.55) (8.75) (8.59)
To-CBD 0.022*** 0.025*** 0.023****** 0.027***
(3.12) (3.46) (3.5) (3.87)
Constant 7.117*** 7.12*** 3.59*** 3.601***
(86.53) (86.27) (47.69) (47.65)
Adjusted R-square 0.8981 0.8973 0.8166 0.8150
Notes: Coeﬃcients are standardized betas; T-stats in parentheses.
**At 5% signiﬁcant level.
*** At 1% signiﬁcant level.
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special context transpiring within Taiwan at the time. The
tension across the Taiwan Strait was serious. From the
Taiwanese perspective, especially government oﬃcials, a
preparation for unexpected scenarios was not redundant.
It would not be surprising if Taiwan’s government had
plans to build backup facilities abroad (Nguyen et al.,
2006). Because of its political and security concerns, it
was explainable for KMT to spend some venture capital
in one of the least developed real estate markets in the
world at the time (Kim, 2008).
The project made progress only after the appearance of
CT&D in late 1989. After some zigzags because of the nov-
elty of the project and the circumstances in Vietnam, Tan
Thuan joint venture was established to build the EPZ.
Vietnam’s side contributed 300 ha of land to receive 30%
interest of the joint venture, and CT&D contributed ﬁnanc-
ing and expertise to own 70%. The investment cost was
estimated at USD 89 million and the investment license
was oﬃcially issued in July 1991 (IPC, 1992).
Construction of the EPZ was completed in 1992.
However, the main objective was the PMH urban area.
The excuse for building the 17.8 km road 10-lanes wide
was to connect the EPZ to the national highway No. 1.
Commercially developing land along two sides of the road
was to partly ﬁnance the road along with the toll revenue.
The arrangement was that the developer would receive
600 ha of land with a 50-year lease term for real estate
development in exchange for the road and 150 ha of built
infrastructure land for public use. This public land is
mixed in with the commercial land of PMH and the600 ha of PMH’s land are divided into ﬁve lots A, B,
C, D and E as illustrated in Fig. 3. Another joint venture
named Phu My Hung Corporation was established in
May 1993 to pursue the project. CT&D also holds 70%
of the interest while the municipal government holds the
remainder.
Financing in such high risk projects is crucial, par-
ticularly at the initial investment stage. The developer
was lucky to have the early involvement of the KMT
as them bearing the risk helped other endeavors have
more conﬁdence to go ahead. In ﬁve years, CT&D
had invested a signiﬁcant amount of money in these
projects (Chang, 2010). However, due to the political
change in Taiwan, the KMT completely pulled out its
investments in 1994 (Vo and TU, 2004). This caused
some troubles for the development. However, the for-
eign partners were able to set up subsidiaries in the
Cayman Islands and the British Virgin Islands, and bor-
rowed about USD 200 million from Taiwanese banks to
make up for the ﬁnancial needs (Nguyen, 2008). Since
then, the ﬁnancing for further development has not been
a major obstacle because the company has been making
huge proﬁts as international accounting ﬁrms estimated
that its annual revenue is over USD 1 billion (Chang,
2010).
Eventually, a megaproject was formed. It consisted of
four key components: a 300 ha EPZ, a 600 ha real estate
project, a 375 MW power plant, and a 10-lane road besides
the municipal government’s ambition to develop an area of
2000 ha. The results of these projects are mixed as analyzed
latter.
Fig. 3. The Saigon South Master Plan. Source: Phu My Hung Corporation.
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The ﬁrst strategic step was the planning and design. In
July 1993, PMH Corporation hosted an international
urban design competition, the ﬁrst ever competition in
Vietnam after the reuniﬁcation in 1975. The winners were
a team of respected architectural ﬁrms including:
Skidmore, Owings and Merrill; Koetter, Kim and
Associates; and Kenzo Tange Associates. The design
received two honorable awards for best urban design, one
was the Progressive Architecture Citation in 1995 and the
other from the American Institute of Architecture in 1997
(PMH Corp., 2011).
The design was for a grand plan of 2600 ha of land
(illustrated in Fig. 3) in which PMH would be granted
600 ha for its commercial development and the rest would
be developed by the government. The plan aims to create a
harmonious built environment. The density is much lower
than surrounding projects. Moreover, the developer has
wisely agreed to give the municipal government 150 ha of
built infrastructure land that is mixed with its commercial
land as a part of the deal to acquire the land. However,
the land designed for public purposes such as parks,
squares and schools has indeed helped increase the value
of commercial land. In fact, due to the possibility to inter-
nalize externalities, the developer would still have reserved
a signiﬁcant proportion of its land for public facilities even
without the agreement.
The construction process has been carefully imple-
mented and strictly followed the design and planning.
Moreover, to mitigate risk, construction has been plannedand implemented in phases. Instead of building the ten-
lane road immediately, a two-lane road was built ﬁrst then
expanded after seeing successful signs of the real estate pro-
jects. Eventually, completed infrastructures have been
built. A good road and sewage system have been com-
pletely constructed. And the same approach has also been
applied for building real estate projects. At the beginning,
the developer only built medium quality apartment build-
ings and sold service land. Since the real estate market
became more vibrant, luxurious villas, condos and oﬃce
buildings have begun to be built (Nguyen et al., 2006).
In order to secure the electricity supply, given that
power blackouts were one of the most obsessive issues in
Vietnam at the time, the developer had cooperated with
other investors to build and operate a 375 MW power plant
named Hiep Phuoc Power Plant. Thanks to this plant, a
power supply free from blackouts had been secured for
over a decade. The power price there had been higher than
the general regulated tariﬀ of the government, but the resi-
dents seemed satisﬁed for a long time. This plant has con-
tributed signiﬁcantly to PMH’s success (Macomber, 2011),
but why the business failed is discussed later.
Furthermore, the developer also made contracts with
water suppliers to ensure uninterrupted water supply.
Telecommunication and cable TV were also given the same
approach. The developer has also granted land and other
favorable conditions to attract schools and hospitals. For
instance, there is an international university – RMIT –
and many high quality schools from elementary to high
school levels. Furthermore, FV Hospital which is owned
by French doctors is perhaps the most well equipped
2 Author’s interview of retired senior oﬃcials of the company in Summer
2011.
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organized social and cultural events actively and purpose-
fully and has also been very active in the charity sector.
The developer has also been the supplier of most urban
services including: security, maintenance, street cleaning,
landscaping and so forth. PMH has established a big cus-
tomer service center along with service companies such as
a tree and landscape company, sanitation companies and
so on. The security is perhaps the best service of PMH. It
invited veterans from United Kingdom to train its body-
guards to build a professional security team (Nguyen
et al., 2006). PMH has even built a bus company to provide
service to the CBD. The ticket fare is three times higher
than that of regular buses, but its service is much better
and more reliable.
The information in www.phumyhung.com.vn is much
richer and more up-to-date than those of the web pages
of other projects. For example, announcements of safety,
preparation for the rainy season or information about
power supply have been very recent in PMH, while there
is no updated information about urban services on
www.vanphathung.com.vn, the webpage of the developer
of Phu My urban area, the second largest urban area after
the PMH in the region.
In summary, urban service provision in PMH is much
better than those of surrounding buildings in particular
and urban services provided by public companies in the
whole city in general. However, the problem is that most
urban services have been heavily subsidized. This raises
the question about the quality of services along with their
ﬁnancial sustainability after the developer sells all proper-
ties, which is analyzed subsequently.
4. Outcomes along with concerns
Tan Thuan EPZ and PMH New Urban are considered
highly successful for the city and the developers, but
Hiep Phuoc Power Plant has been losing money and the
implementation of the Saigon South Master Plan has
essentially been failed. Furthermore, there are concerns
about the ﬁnancial sustainability of the urban service
provision, urban sprawl, segregation and environmental
issues.
4.1. Mixed outcomes
On the successful sides, Tan Thuan EPZ has almost
been fully built and is generating huge beneﬁts for
Vietnam’s economy. It was rated as the best industrial zone
in Asia by Euromoney’s Corporate Location Magazine
(TTC, 2011). 179 investors have invested USD 1.559 billion
to generate 64,000 jobs and USD 2.1 billion export rev-
enue. It is impressive that Tan Thuan EPZ’s net export rev-
enue in 2013 (after subtracting imported inputs) was USD
500 million while the whole country net export was only
USD 853 million, but it has recently generated modest
ﬁnancial proﬁts (IPC, 2014).PMH has become the most successful case in major
aspects. Initially, many people, including some of PMH’s
senior oﬃcials, were not optimistic. But now, they have
been impressed by its success.2 Regarding Vietnam’s econ-
omy, this is the most desirable urban development. It has
been generating huge revenue for the state budget and
oﬃcially recognized as a national model for urban develop-
ment by Vietnam’s government (Ministry of Construction,
2008). From the business perspective, it is one of the most
proﬁtable real estate projects. International accounting
ﬁrms estimated that its annual revenue is over one billion
dollars (Chang, 2010). From 1998 (the time when revenue
generation started) through to 2009, the government has
received about USD 500 million from tax revenues and
dividends (Ngo and Huynh (2010)). An estimate based
on several sources shows that from 1998 to 2009 PMH’s
aggregate revenue, cost and proﬁt was around USD 1.3 bil-
lion, USD 560 million and USD 500 million respectively.
The internal rate of return (IRR) of the net proﬁt, includ-
ing incurred loss and costs, of this period is 125%. Even
assuming conservatively that the cost of the road was
wholly disbursed at the beginning, the IRR is still 30%,
much higher than required rate of return around 20%.
This is a uniquely successful example of new town
developments.
On the opposite side, Hiep Phuoc Power Plant is a prob-
lematic case. It has been losing money due to the wide gap
between costs and tariﬀs (Dong-Anh, 2011). The operating
cost of this fuel powered plant is much higher than that of
hydro-powered or gas-powered ones. According to the
contract with Vietnam Electricity Corporation (EVN),
the price to obtain a fair proﬁt margin in the ﬁrst quarter
of 2011 was 17 cent/kWh, while the retail price charged
to industrial plans in the Tan Thuan EPZ was only
5 cent/kWh, and the retail price for households in PMH
was less than 10 cent/kWh (Quang-Khai, 2011). To limit
the losses, the power company has transferred the
responsibility for supplying power for PMH and Tan
Thuan to EVN (Lam, 2011). This means that the advan-
tage of having its own power plant was dissolved and since
then the residents in PMH started to bear the risk of
blackout.4.2. Failure of implementing the master plan of the whole
region
As mentioned above, the designed plan is for an area of
2600 ha, which is equivalent to the area of ﬁve districts in
the downtown (1, 3, 5, 10, and Phu Nhuan). PMH’s ﬁve
lots of land are dispersed across this area. This was a wise
intention for the city because if PMH successfully develops
their land, and the remainder as expected goes according to
plan, a good and solid urban area for over two million
3 Author’s collection of information from residents living in the two
buildings in August 2011.
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the actual development of Saigon South has no longer fol-
lowing the master plan. Mr. Hoang Minh Tri, a former
head of HCMC’s Urban Planning Institute bitterly com-
mented: “The planning for Saigon South proposed by the
city’s urban planning institute and Phu My Hung
Corporation along with SOM (an American Consultant)
to the Prime Minister’s approval in 1994 has almost had
no role in the current development of Saigon South.”
(Nguyen-Khoa, 2012).
Parallel with PMH, the establishment of South Saigon
Development Corporation (SADECO) in 1994 to develop
the rest of the 2600 ha master plan along with the
responsibility of land clearance for the whole plan would
have been a strategic step (IPC, 2001). The joint stock com-
pany was designed to invite prominent investors including
the municipal government, district governments and big
corporations to share in the ownership of the company
(Nguyen et al., 2006). This aim was to create a strong sup-
porting coalition – a critical condition for a megaproject as
argued by Altshuler and Luberoﬀ (2003). Unfortunately,
such a desirable coalition had not been formed because
there were no direct interests for those in charge of power
and inﬂuence while interests by acquiring speciﬁc pieces of
land in the SADECO area have been more obvious.
Moreover, there has been no ﬁnancial support such as that
witnessed in the PMH project. The Management Authority
of Saigon South Development was established in 1997 by
Vietnam’s Prime Minister, but, its role has not proven to
be eﬀective. Many pieces of land have been divided frag-
mentally and assigned for numerous developers dispersedly
to build some types of real estate and sell them quickly
without concern for the impact on other infrastructure or
amenities (Huynh, 2012). Consequently, their real estate
values have been signiﬁcantly lower than equivalent ones
in PMH as proved above.
Ironically, SADECO was able to help the Tan Thuan
and PMH joint ventures to assemble large tracks of land
(nearly 1000 ha) to become the most successful developers
in Vietnam, but it has not been able to run itself well. Its
revenues of over four million dollars and proﬁts of over
one million dollars in 2014 posted in its webpage
(http://www.sadeco.com.vn/) were modest in comparison
to PMH’s. SADECO has neither achieved lucrative
business nor has the municipal government been able to
implement the Saigon South Master Plan as designed.
This is indeed a disappointing failure.
4.3. Concerns
There are at least four concerns arising at present. The
ﬁrst concern is the future ﬁnancial sustainability of urban
service provision in PMH. Huynh (2012) points out that
the developer has heavily subsidized many urban services
in the area, which has helped maintain a higher quality
of urban service provisions while the costs incurred to resi-
dents have been lower than those of surrounding projects.For example, the maintenance fee including parking of My
Khang building in 2011 was about USD 25 for a 100 SQM
apartment in comparison to USD 40 excluding parking of
neighboring complex Phu My.3 Even the monthly fees at
PMH have been signiﬁcantly increased recently and is only
barely enough to fund the services within buildings.
Disputes have become more frequent as the developer
has begun to transfer the responsibility for some services,
such as security within buildings, to other providers. The
developer has also started to transfer the management
responsibility to building management boards nominated
by the residents in each building or block. More seriously,
the major burden is the expense of maintaining the land-
scape and infrastructure outside buildings in an area of
four SQKM. There is no sustainable revenue for it yet
and the burden is on the developer’s shoulders now. As
urban services are outsourced their quality seems to be
deteriorating. If the trend continues, the diﬀerence between
the quality of the urban services provided in PMH and the
others may not be so signiﬁcant over time, especially after
the developer sells all its real estate products and is no
longer subsidizing urban services. Thus, the city’s govern-
ment should think about a more reasonable policy to gen-
erate enough revenues to maintain the current quality of
the urban service provision when the lease is terminated.
Otherwise, the problem of poor service quality elsewhere
in the city may happen in PMH in the future.
The second concern is urban sprawl, which is deﬁned as
the wasteful use of land through uncontrolled, uninter-
rupted monotonous expansion (Peiser 1989). Urban sprawl
is perhaps a big problem for the Saigon South now and
burdens on infrastructure can be very heavy (Huynh,
2012). Urban sprawl has become the catch phrase for
everything that is bad about urban growth today (Peiser,
2001), and a global problem (UN-Habitat, 2010). It has
negative impacts for the whole society. From an economic
perspective, urban sprawl creates a burden on infrastruc-
ture and requires more energy and materials to maintain
than a compact city due to homes, oﬃces and utilities being
further apart (UN-Habitat, 2011). Burdens on transporta-
tion frameworks have a major negative impact of urban
sprawl (Newman and Kenworthy, 1989; Ewing, 1997).
The third concern is segregation and gentriﬁcation.
Gated communities are residential areas with restricted
access in which normally public spaces are privatized
(Blakely and Snyder, 1997; Blandy et al., 2003). The most
obvious problem is segregation as the rich and the poor
are separated into two diﬀerent worlds. It is hard to ﬁnd
any study of gated communities that does not raise the con-
cern of segregation (Blakely and Snyder, 1997; Blandy
et al., 2003; Logan, 2009; Sassen, 2010; Sardar, 2010;
Bagaeen and Uduku, 2010). Social segregation in urban
areas is considered undesirable (Goldsmith, 1997). David
D. Huynh / International Journal of Sustainable Built Environment 4 (2015) 125–135 133(1990) raised the concern of the spatial segregation by
gated communities. Another objection is the loss of public
spaces, which are the sites of social and ritual interaction of
the heterogeneous population, and the place for public
consciousness of mutual obligation (Sardar, 2010).
Because of privatization and restrictions, public spaces
such as parks within gated communities are open only to
residents in those communities (Landman, 2010). Cities
of walls and urban fortresses are common terms referring
to the negative impacts of gated communities (Blakely
and Snyder, 1997; Blandy et al., 2003; Caldeira, 2000;
Foldvary, 1994; Huang and Low, 2008). A ﬁnal objection
is that gated communities generally have low-density pop-
ulations that place a strain on infrastructure. The develop-
ment of Saigon South, as Waibel (2004, 2009) points out, is
contributing to the increasing process of physical, func-
tional, and social segregation within the municipality of
HCMC. Moreover, gentriﬁcation has been happening since
the poor have been pushed out to reserve the land for the
wealthier populations (To et al., 1997).
The fourth concern is that building towns on wetland
causes environmental problems and exacerbates the poten-
tial danger of ﬂooding due to rising sea levels. Wetlands
provide many important if not vital nature-related services
to human society such as ﬂood protection, wildlife
habitats, nutrient storage, related pollution control, shore-
line protection, and storm buﬀer zones (Shin et al., 1997;
Turner, 1991; Turner et al., 2000; Department of Ecology
– Washington State, 1997). Unfortunately, the role and sig-
niﬁcance of wetlands are not always fully recognized by
policymakers. Thus, wetlands are routinely reclaimed for
residential and industrial uses that are of higher commer-
cial value (Shin et al., 1997). Wetlands have been lost
because of urban and industrial sprawl all over the world
(Pinder and Witherick, 1990) as local governments usually
have strong motivations to expand built-up and industrial
zones (Hesselink, 1996). However, wetland destruction
damages health, safety, productivity, amenities, and eco-
logical value. In HCMC, ﬂooding and sea level rising have
become much more serious recently. Saigon South is con-
sidered both the culprit and bearer of the problem.
Moreover, the longer term ecological impacts of building
a massive city on swampland have not been assessed and
are of potential concern (Douglass and Huang, 2007).
5. Conclusions and lessons
Phu My Hung New Urban Development is a rare suc-
cessful case in some major aspects as internalizing exter-
nalities has worked there. The developer was able to
assemble large tracks of land and secure ﬁnancial needs
to ﬁnish big components of a megaproject. They have also
been motivated to provide ample and aﬀordable public
goods and urban services by increased real estate value
and earned signiﬁcant proﬁts. However, these incentives
can decrease altogether as the developments are sold oﬀ.
Moreover, PMH is only a part of the Saigon SouthMaster Plan, whose implementation has essentially failed.
There are also serious concerns on urban sprawl, segrega-
tion and environmental issues arising at present. At least
four lessons can be drawn from this case study.
First, internalizing externalities is practical, but there are
also problems. Thanks to high autonomy in developing a
large area of land, the developers have actively provided
compatible design, landscaping, infrastructure, and urban
services. These features have created beneﬁts for the real
estate business in PMH. However, since development
building continues, providing all basic urban services has
begun to surpass the capacity and capabilities of the
developer. Quality of urban services has begun to vary
along with inviting other providers. As discussed with a
number of PMH’s senior oﬃcials and those providing
urban services during my research process, the company
is struggling to ﬁnd solutions. Without “forcing” residents
to pay for all the services they receive, the urban service
provision is not ﬁnancially sustainable. As a result, PMH
may even have to experience the problem of poor urban
service provision that the city needs to confront as a whole.
This is indeed a huge challenge for PMH. The prediction:
“the solution works only to internalize externalities and
provide initial public goods at the time of development”
by DiPasquale and Wheaton (1993) is likely to occur.
Second, favorable conditions in unique circumstances
are also signiﬁcant. The project has been successful partly
due to ﬁrst mover’s advantage and at least three favorable
conditions mentioned below. Firstly, privacy and shielding
from the public’s focus was important. During the prepara-
tion time of Tan Thuan and PMH, only a few believed
those projects to be successful. This helped the developers
avoid troubles. Whereas the situation was opposite when
SADECO was established as interests in the land were
obvious. Therefore, many tried to get their own interests
instead of collectively and comprehensively implementing
the Saigon South Master Plan. Secondly, not only did the
municipal government grant high autonomy for the devel-
oper to determine how they wanted to build it, but they
also invested huge eﬀorts and resources into the project.
In particular, the government was in charge of the land
clearance, usually labeled as one of the most diﬃcult tasks
(Nguyen et al., 2006). Nearly 1000 ha of land were assem-
bled with only some minor issues (IPC, 2001). Thirdly, it
was fortunate to have the involvement of a public entity
like KMT as the initial ﬁnancial need was beyond the scope
of the Vietnamese investors and it was particularly hard for
private investors to spend millions of dollars in such a risky
investment environment. The public-like money from
KMT played the prominent role in the area of ﬁnancing.
When KMT withdrew in 1994, the project’s prospect was
already clear. Therefore, the Taiwanese investors who
remained were motivated and were able to mobilize capital
to continue their investment. These favorite and unique
conditions make it extremely diﬃcult to mimic the
PMH model comprehensively, although some aspects are
learnable.
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part of the picture. As the saying goes, “every coin has
two sides”. Risk and uncertainty will always be a matter,
especially when doing business in a developing country.
There was a dispute on the corporate income tax due to
the ambiguity of regulations and laws in the early 2000s.
Eventually, PMH had to pay a 25% tax rate instead of
10% written in the initial investment license. Furthermore,
there has been a dispute on paying fees to transfer land
using legal rights since 2008. It has become complicated
now (Ngo and Huynh, 2010). Finally, the outlook to get
the rest of land promised for PMH (300 ha) is unclear now.
Finally, the result should be put in a comprehensive pic-
ture. Obviously, PMH is a successful case, but it is only a
part of the Saigon South Master Plan, whose imple-
mentation has essentially failed. There are also serious con-
cerns on urban sprawl, segregation and environmental
issues arising at present. Therefore, the prestige and lux-
uriousness of PMH is the pride of HCMC, but undesirable
externalities should be considered and mitigated. Being put
in the Saigon South Master Plan and related issues, Phu
My Hung is only a partial success of a broader landscape
indeed. The hurdles and problems happening in this case
are quite common in many other places.
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